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DO FINANCIAL INCENTIVES ENCOURAGE
WELFARE RECIPIENTS TO WORK?




This paper reports on a randomized evaluation of an earnings subsidy offered to long-term
welfare recipients in Canada. The program -- known as the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP) --
provides a supplement equal to one-half of the difference between a target earnings level and a
participant’s actual earnings. The SSP supplement is similar to a negative income tax with two
important differences: (1) eligibility is limited to long-term welfare recipients who find a full-time
job; and (2) the payment depends on individual earnings rather than family income. Our evaluation
is based on a classical randomized design: one half of a group of single parents who had been on
welfare for over a year were eligible to receive the SSP supplement, while the other half were
assigned to a control group, Results for an early cohort of SSP participants and controls suggest that











Coral Gables, FL 33124In Canada, as in the United States, welfare expenditures and caseloads have expanded
steadily over the past three decades. Behveen 1981 and 1991, for example, federal and
provincial expenditures u~iated with the Canada Assistance Plan almost tripled, with incr=ses
in individual provinces ranging from 200 to almost 500 percent (Courchene, 1994). Faced with
rising welfare wsts and budget deficits, Canadian policymakers have begun -thing for
measures to increase welfare recipients’ self-sufficiency and reduce their dependence on
government transfers.
Most welfare recipients in Canada do not work. For example, in British Columbia and
New Brunswick, only about 20 percent of single parents who receive public assistanu report any
earnings in a given month. * This circumstance, of course, is not unique to Canada —- the
proportion of welfare =ipients who work in the United States is also small. The low rates of
labor market attachment on both sides of the border reflect a similar dilemma for many welfare
recipients. On the one hand, available jobs tend to pay low wages; on the other hand, by
rducing benefits by up to a dollar for every dollar of sings, the welfare system imposes a
very high “tax rate” on r~ipients’ work effort.
This paper presents early findings from art experimental evaluation of a new program
designed to encourage work and self-sufficiency among the welfare population in Canada. The
program -- known as the Self-Sufficiency Project or SSP -- attempts to balan~ the dual
challenges of low wages and high marginal tax rates by offering an earnings subsidy to welfare
raipients who fmd a full-time job and leave welfare. Specifically, participants in the SSP
progmm receive one-half of the difference between their actual mings and an earnings “target”
set ~nsiderably above the level of welfare benefits available to most families. The SSP
evaluation is b- on a randomized design: one-half of a group of long-term welf~e recipients
in two provinces (British Columbia and New Brunswick) were eligible for the supplement (the
program group); the other half were not (the control group). As in other recent evaluations of
lThis figure is based on household survey data from the Self-Sufficiency Projwt, Official welfare rwords
exhibit somewhat lower employment ra-.U.S. welfare programs (=, for example, Friedlander and Burtless, 1995), this randomized
design makes itpossible to draw credible inferences about the impact of SSP from simple
comparisons between the outcomes of those who were offered the supplement and those who
were not.
The full SSP evaluation entails a five-year follow-up of some 6,CKK) families. The findings
in this paper are based on the first 18-24 months of follow-up data for about 2,000 families in
an initial cohort of SSP enrollees.2 Already, however, systematic and highly significant
differences in labor market attachment and welfare participation rates between the program and
control groups suggest that the financial incentives of SSP aff=t a sizeable proportion of single-
parent welfare recipients.
As background information for the SSP demonstration, S~tion I describes the nature of
the work incentives facing Canadian welfare recipients. Section II describes the design of SSP
and discusses the incentive effwts of the program using a standard labor supply framework.
Section III describes the characteristics of the research sample analyzed in this paper. Section
IV presents estimates of the impact of the SSP program on labor market outcomes and welfare
receipt. Section V presents some preliminary findings on the extent to which responses to the
SSP program vary with the relative generosity of the supplement. Section VI analyzes the wages
of jobs taken by SSP participants, and Swt.ion VII discusses possible response biases that affect
the size of the impacts reportd in the main body of the paper. Finally, Section VIII summarizes
the paper’s findings and outlines the evaluation’s future
I. Work InHtiv~ in the ~ Welh System
research.
There is no single national welfare program in Canada. Instead, the Canada Assistance
Plan s~ifies a cost-sharing arrangement between the federal and provincial governments and
%ese individuals were enrolled in the
December 1993.
SSP demonstration betwmn November 1992 to
-2-each provinm administers its own welfare, or Income Assistance (IA), program. Nevertheless,
the provincial LAsystems share many key features, most notably that IA applicants are subj=t
to a “rids test” and that IA payments are offset by income from employment or other sources.
M benefits are linked to family size: in 1992, a single parent with one child was entitled to a
maximum of $9,841 per ya in New Brunswick (one of the less generous provinces) and
$12,478 per year in British Columbia (one of the more generous provinces).3
IA recipients are discouraged from worlcing by benefit rules that reduw IA payments
dollar-fordollar with any earnings (or other iname) above a modest “disregard” amount (e.g.
$200 per month for single-parent families in New Brunswick). Canadian welfare rwipients who
work also stand to lose certain in-kind benefits, including subsidized housing, free dental
services, and prescription drugs. (Unlike the United States, there is no food stamp program in
Canada), Finally, welfare recipients’ earnings are subject to payroll and income taxes. The
latter are especially important Wuse, except for the first few hundred dollars of wages, higher
earnings reduce the income tax credit paid to low-income families, leading to a net positive
income tax liability. The combination of a 100 percent implicit tax rate in the welfare system
and a significant marginal tax rate in the income tax system crates a strong disincentive to work
for many IA recipients.
l-r. The Self-Sufficiency Proj@
The work disincentives built into the Canadian welfare system pose a critical question for
policy makers. If incentives could be modified to “make work pay, ” would a larger fraction of
IA recipients take jobs and leave welfare? Over the past 25 years, a variety of programs have
b=n proposed and implemented (some experimentally) to answer this question, including a
‘See National Council of Welfare, 1992, and Bl~ and Hanratty, 1992, for a detailed compariwn of the U.S.
and Canadian welfare systems. All monetary figure presented in this paper are in Canadian dollars.
-3-negative iname tax (NTT’),4 enhan~ or flexible earnings disregards (~ Greenberg,
Michalopoulos, Robins, and Wood, 1995), income tax credits (e.g. the Earned Inmme Tax
Credit in the United States), and direct job training or placement services. The available
evidence suggests that few of these programs have a large effect on work activity. Research on
the experimental NIT programs run in the United States and Canada in the 1970s concluded that
they increased work incentives for some families and reduced them for others, with a net
nega-ve effect on work for eligible families. Research on enhand earnings disregard programs
points to a similarly mixed conclusion. Although a higher earnings disregard increases work
incentives for non-working welfare recipients, it may lower work incentives for those who are
working, and it may encourage some non-recipients to enter welfare (Moffitt, 1992), Tax credit
programs lead to the same combination of higher work incentives for some (at the lowest levels
of earnings) and reduced work incentives for others (whose earnings fall in the “phase-out”
range).5 Finally, evaluations of many different types of employment, education, and training
services programs suggest that most have only a modest capacity to increase employment and
earnings, although some spific programs have been more successful.4
In this context, the SSP supplement was conceived as an alternative approach to
encouraging work among welfare recipients, with explicit provisions to minimize the labor supply
disincentives of a conventional negative income tax.7 The three key ingredients of the SSP
program are: (1) a substantial financial incentive for work relative to non-work, (2) a relativel y
low marginal tax rate on the earnings of those who work, and (3) a “full-time” work requirement
4NIT experiments were mnducti in both Canada and the United States, For a discussion of the Canadian NIT
experiment - Hum and Simpm, 1991. For a dixussion of the U.S. NIT experiments see Moffitt and Kehrer,
1981; Robins, 1985; and Munnell, 198d,
5% K~lman md Ridden, 1991; Hoffman and Seidman, 1990; and Scholz, 1993; for analy~ of various tax
credit programs.
6S= Gueron, 1991; Gueron and Pauly, 1991; Greenberg and Wiseman, 1992; and Riccio, Friedlander, and
Freedman, 1994,
‘me id= of an earnings supplement was conceived by an advisory committm of the Innovations Branch of
Human R-urce,s and Development Canada. For details on how the program model was chosen and implemented,
see SRDC, 1993 and Greenberg, brig, Meyer, Michalopoulos, and Robins, 1995.
-4-(30 hours per week) that prevents most people from reducing their work hours in response to the
program.
A. The Earnings Supplemt
Assuming that the 30-hour work requirement is met, the SSP mings supplement is equal
to half the differenw between a participant’s gross labor mings and a target or “break-even”
earnings levels Unearned inmme (such as child support or rental r~ipts) or earnings of other
family members do mt affat the supplement payment. The supplement is also independent of
family sti. During the first year of the SSP demonstration, the target mings level was set at
$37,000 in British Columbia and $30,000 in New Brunswick (Canadian dollars). These levels
were designed to provide a substantial work incentive for most families. For example, a British
Columbia participant who worked 30 hours per w~k (1,500 hours per year) at $7 per hour (1
dollar above the minimum wage) would earn $10,500 per year and coll~t a $13,250 SSP
supplement.
Figures 1 to 3 show simplified relationships betwen hours of work and total income under
IA and SSP for a single parent with one child who earns the minimum wage in British Columbia
and New Brunswick.g The two figures for British Columbia reflect the two different -ings
disregards in that province’s IA program: the basic earnings disregard ($200 per month) and an
enhand disregard ($200 plus 25 percent of earnings) available during the first 12 months of
employment. As the figures make clear, SSP has two essential differences from the conventional
welfare program. First, SSP offers substantially higher total income than IA for a “full-time”
job (30 or more hours per week). Second, unlike IA, which has a 100 percent tax rate on
8Forrnally, the supplement is given by S = .5(E* - E), where S is the supplement, E- is the target earnings
level, and E is actual eam.ings. This is a conventional NIT fomula, except that benefits are available only for full-
tirne workers and depend on individual earnings rather than family income,
%- figures do not take into ~unt the intentions of SSP or IA with other M and transfer progmrns. Since
SSP benefits are subj~t to provincial and federal income tax~, and IA benefiu are not, the relative generosity of
SSP is exaggerated in the figures. The relative generosity of SSP for larger families is over-stated in Figure 1-3,
sinw IA kfits rise with family sin while SSP benefits do not.
-5-additional earnings, SSP benefits are reduced by only $.50 for each $1.00 of earnings. Thus,
SSP offers a tinancial incentive for higher work effort and also rewards individuals who find a
higher-wage job. While Figures 1 to 3 ignore child care COSNand the complex interaction
betw=n SSP and the provincial and federal income tax systems, the basic character of the
SSP/IA amparison is unchanged when these issues are taken into account. As described more
fully in Section V, most single parents’ net incomes (accounting for taxes, child care costs, and
so forth) are $3,000 to $5,~ per year higher under SSP than if they had worked the same
amount and remained on IA.
B. Eligibility Requirements
Eligibility for the SSP demonstration wa limited to single parents who had b~rt on IA for
10 People who were assigned to the program group were at least 12 of the previous 13 months.
given up to 12 months from the date of notification of eligibility to obtain a full-time job and
initiate a first supplement payment. Those who begart receiving SSP payments within this time
frame then became eligible for SSP supplements over the next three years (that is, for up to 36
months after the date of their first supplement payment). Those who did not initiate an SSp
payment within the initial 12-month period lost any further eligibility. Supplement initiators were
required to discontinue IA receipt, although they could return to IA (and give up the supplement
payments) at any time during their period of eligibility.
The SSP earnings supplement is paid monthly and is limited to individuals who work a
minimum of 30 hours per week during the month and who earn at last the minimum wage.
Supplement recipients are ~uired to mail in pay stubs verifying their hours of work and
sings for the month. Individuals who do not m=t the minimum 30-hour work requirement
‘%s limit on eligibility was intended botb to reduce the incentive for people to apply for IA simply to gain
eligibility for 55P (so-called entry effects), and also to target program resourm to recipients with the gratest
difficultie-s in getting off welfare, A ~~te experiment is being conducted in British Columbia to measure whether
new applimts to IA extend their welfare spells to become eligible for SSP.
-6-for any given mont-b may receive a pro-rated portion of their supplement for the period.
However, pro-rating over a “partial month” is permitted only twice during each 12-month period
– after that the supplement is discontinued until the full-time hours threshold is met again.
c. Other F~ of SSP
The mandate of the SSP demonstration to test a volunfary earnings supplement pses a
potential problem for implementation. On the one hand, for the demonstration to replicate art
on-going program, it is important that individuals understand the details of the program and the
potential benefits of finding a full-time job. On the other hand, it is vital that the SSP evaluation
not be compromised by “Hawthorne effects” arising from s~ial treatment of the participants,
or by the availability of extra services to the program group. Thus, the SSP “treatment”
combined an outreach program designed to inform the program group about the benefits and
operation of the supplement with a modest package of information and referrals to existing
community services. Once informed about their eligibility for the SSP supplement, potential
participants were asked to attend an information workshop at art SSP office, where program staff
explained the supplement offer and provided information on the child care, housing,
transportation, and job-counselling sexvices available to all IA recipients. 11
In the 12-month period of potential eligibility for art initial supplement payment, SSP staff
regularly contacted the program group members to answer questions about the supplement and
to invite them to a money management workshop. After the expiration of their one-year
eligibility window, program group members who chose not to initiate a supplement were no
longer contacted by SSP staff. Those who initiated a supplement continued to receive supplement
payments if they met the eligibility r~uirements, They were invited to attend further money
management workshops, but post-supplement contact was limited and mainly client-driven.
‘lNinety-six percent of people assigned to the SSP program group attended the initial information session.
-7-D. ---
The expected impacts of the SSP program depend on incentives that vary from person to
person and over time, depending on what individuals would do in the absence of the program.
For analytical purposes, it is useful to distinguish betw=n four “counterfactual” groups, based
on whether an individual would work more or less than 30 hours per week in the absence of the
SSP supplement offer, and whether an individual would have continued to receive IA payments
in the absence of SSP. 12 By design, SSP pardcipants who work full-time rtiive a higher
income than they would under IA for a similar or lesser amount of work. Thus, standard
economic thary suggests that the SSP supplement will induce some pple who othemise would
have remained on IA and worked less than 30 hours per week to move from welfare to full-time
employment. A similar prediction holds for pple who othewise would be off IA and either
working part time or not at all. These predicted positive effects for non-workers and part-time
workers will be larger, the bigger the net income for a full-time job under SSP relative to net
income in the absence of the supplement, and the more that individuals value extra income versus
non-working time (i.e., the larger the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply).
Individuals who would have worked full time in the absence of a supplement offer receive
a windfall from the SSP program. These ~ple can mive a supplement without changing their
work hours, and some of them may be able to cut their hours and still remain eligible. Consider
first individuals in the “windfall group” who othemise would have been off IA. The supplement
offer provides them with higher net income, and also lowers their net wage, since once on SSP
each additional dollar of earnings reduces their supplement payment by 50 cents. For these
individuals, standard mnomic theory predicts t!!at the supplement will reduce hours and
earnings. 13 By comparison, for individuals who would have worked full time but remained on
IA, the effect of the SSP supplement is ambiguous because the supplement raises their net income
‘*All four of these “counterfactual” groups are present in the control group in later months of the demonstmtion.
13This is the standard response to a negative income tax.
-8-(reducing work incentives) but raises their net
Overall, then, the ex~ted impacts of
fractions of individuals on and off 1A working
wage (possibly increasing work incentives).
the SSP program depend on three factors: the
full time or less than full time in the absence of
the program; the relative generosity of the program; and the willingness of individuals to
substitute non-working time for income. The smaller the fraction of people who would be
ex~ted to work full time in the absence of the program, the more likely the program is to
generate incr~s in work effort (higher hours, earnings, and full-time employment rates). The
larger the fraction of people for whom SSP is a windfall, the smaller the predicted effects of the
program. This reasoning suggests that the actual eff~t of the SSP program may vary over the
wurse of the demonstration, with potential y smaller effwts later in the demonstration, when a
larger fmction of participants might have b~n ex~ted to be working full time anyway.
Another consideration that arises in predicting the impact of the SSP program is stigma.
Existing research suggests that many welfare participants have a strong distaste for “being on
welfare”: They resent the reporting requirements imposed by the system or feel ostracized by
friends and ~ial contacts (Moffitt, 1983b). Since the SSP supplement does not depend on living
arrangements or on other family members’ incomes, and the program rquires no contact with
case workers, some people may prefer to leave welfare and participate in SSP even if the
financial gain is relatively modest. To the extent that individuals attach greater stigma to
continuing IA receipt than to SSP participation, one would ex~t an Wi[ioml positive effwt
of SSP on full-time employment, hours, and earnings.
was randomly sel~ted from administrative rosters of 1A
m. The SSP R~h Sample
The SSP research sample
recipients in the lower mainland of British Columbia and in southern New Brunswick who were:
(1) single parents, (2) over 18 years of age, and (3) had received IA payments for at least 12 of
the past 13 months. No other restrictions (for example, on health status) were imposed on
-9-eligibility. Intake for the fit cohofi of the re=ch sample began in November 1992 and
14 Recruitment and intake for a ~ond cohort began in continued through D=mber 1993.
January 1994 and mntinued until March 1995.
Sample members were contacted at home and informed that they had kn selected to
participate in a research project involving the possibility of a wage supplement. They were then
asked to sign an informed consent waiver granting access to various administrative r~ords
(including federal tax rmrds) and to complete a baseline intemiew. Roughly 90 percent of
sel=ted individuals agreed to participate, yielding a first cohort re-ch sample of 2,122 (701
from New Brunswick and 1,421 from British Columbia). After signing the consent waiver and
completing the baseline interview, sample members were randomly assigned to either the control
group (1,056 individuals) or the program group (1,066 individuals).
Data on the research sample are currently available from the baseline survey, IA
administrative rmrds, SSP Program Management Information System records, and a survey
conducted at approximately 18 months after the date of random assignment. (Additional surveys
are scheduled for 36 and 54 months after the date of random assignment. ) The baseline survey
collected retrospective labor market information from the time of enrollment back until
approximately one year before enrollment. The 18-month survey collected similar retrospective
data from the time of the suney back to the date of enrollment.
Unfortunately, not all individuals in the first cohort of the research sample could be located
or would agr= to participate in the 18-month survey. The overall response rate was 90 percent,
and was slightly higher in New Brunswick (92 percent) than in British Columbia (89 percent).
While high by conventional standards, the response rate was significantly lower for the SSP
program group (88 percent) than for the control group (92 ~rcent). This difference introduces
a potential biw into comparison of outcomes betw~n the program group members and control
14SSPintake was staggered over a two-yar period to ease program management and to allow a relatively small
staff to provide information sessions for wple members who were offered the wage supplement.
-1o-group members who rqnded to the 18-month survey. Nevertheless, most of the analysis in
this paper is based on the subset of program and control group members who responded to the
18-month su~ey. A formal analysis of the potential biases due to differential response rates is
presented in Section VII below. For simplicity, we refer to the subsample of individuals who
resWnded to the 18-month survey as the “18-month sample”. It consists of 1,910 individuals:
942 progxam group members and 968 control group members, with 1,264 individuals from
British Columbia and 646 from New Brunswick.
A. Overview of the Provinti Mr Market Settings
Before describing the SSP re=ch wmples in more detail, it is useful to describe the labor
market context for the SSP evaluation. Table 1summarizes some relevant information about the
British Columbia and New Brunswick economies, as well as the IA and SSP program parameters
in the two provinces. British Columbia is the third largest province in Canada (population 2.9
million) while New Brunswick is much smaller (O.6 million); together, they comprise about 15
perant of Canada’s total population. In both provinces, labor market conditions improved
slightly over the 1992 to 1994 period, although unemployment rates remained at relatively high
levels. British Columbia had a higher employment-to-population ratio and a lower unemployment
rate than New Brunswick, but a higher proportion of families in poverty. During the sample
period the minimum wage wu $1.00 higher in British Columbia than in New Brunswick ($6.00
versus $5.OC) per hour). Average monthly earnings of full-time female workers were similarly
about 25 percent higher in British Columbia.
Average IA benefit rates are about 30 percent more generous in British Columbia,
averaging $1,079 per month, versus $733 in New Brunswick. The more generous welfare
system in British Columbia is one reason why the SSP break-even level was set higher there than
in New Brunswick. Overall, however, the SSP program is potentially a bit more generous in
New Brunswick: For an individual working 30 hours per w~k at the minimum wage in both
-11-provinm, gross earnings and SSP supplements are more than twice the average IA benefits in
New Brunswick, whereas the relative difference is somewhat smaller in British Columbia.
B. The SSP Samples: Hptive Statistics
Table 2 wntains information on the characteristics of the 1,910 individuals in the 18-month
sample (that is, individuals in the first cohort of the SSP sample who responded to the 18-month
su~ey). The data are taken mairdy from the baseline survey, although some information from
IA administrative records is also presented. Column 1 of the table shows the average
characteristics of the full sample, while columns 2 and 3 show data separately by province.
Columns 4 and 5 show mm chmcteristics for mmple members in the program group (those
eligible for SSP subsidies) and for those in. tie control group (those not eligible for SSP
subsidies), Finally, column 6 presents the t-statistics associated with a test to determine whether
the mm characteristics of the progmm group and control group are identical.’s
The personal and family background characteristics in Table 2 suggest that the SSP target
group are mainly female, have relatively low levels of education, and grew up in families with
poorly-educated parents. A sizeable prcentage (35 to 45 percent) were raised by a single parent
or in some other non-traditional family mgement, and many report that their own parents
received some form of welfare. On average, =mple members have 1.5 children, and virtually
all need some child care serviees.
The IA and work histories of the research sample are also informative. Sample members
r~ived IA payments in 30 of the last 36 months, on average, and about 60 percent had been
on IA continuously for over two years. The average IA benefit amount rmeived in the month
before random assignment was $655 in New Brunswick and $1,004 in British Columbia. These
amounts are about 10 pereent lower than the average statutory benefit rates for single parents
‘sAssuming random assignment ad ignoring non-response to the 18-month survey, the mm of the program
group and the control group should k significantly different only by chance.
-12-with the average number ofihildren in the respective provinces (see Table 1), reflecting benefit
reductions for earnings and other factors.
Almost all of the sample members report that they have worked for pay at some time in
the wt. Indeed, the average number of years of paid employment is fairly high (6 to 8 years,
depending on the province). Nevertheless, only about 20 permnt worked in the month before
random assignment, and the mean number of months worked in the 10 months prior to the
baseline is 2. Average sings (among those who worked) are about $500 per month in New
Brunswick and $600 in British Columbia. The gap is consistent with other data showing roughly
20 percent higher wages in British Columbia than in New Brunswick.
On the bwis of the information in Table 2, two primary conclusions can be drawn about
the SSP target population. First, the target group -- single parents with a lengthy history of IA
receipt -- are mainly poorly educated women from disadvantaged family backgrounds. Normally,
such individuals would be ex~ted to have low wages and intermittent employment histories.
Second, although most of the SSP population has held ajob sometime in the pint, and many have
long work histories, their recent labor market attachment is relatively weak. Thus, the SSP
population could be characteri~ as having relatively disadvantaged “permanent characteristics”
(such as education and family background) and relatively poor “transitory outcomes” (such as
low levels of work in the past year), This combination suggests that, in [he absence of the SSP
progrum, we might expect to see some mdesr improvement in labor market outcomes for many
of the sample members over the next few yms, but that members of the SSP target population
would be likely to exprience low wages and intermittent employment rates.
-13-IV. Basic Impacts During the First 18 Months
A. M-1ogy
Although a full a=sment of the SSP program will require information from art extended
follow-up period, several features of the SSP design make it useful to examine impacts at 18
months. Eligibility for the SSP supplement is contingent on initiating a supplement payment
within one year after enrollment. Thereafter, participants can move in and out of full-time
employment and continue to qualify for supplement payments whenever they meet the hours
requirements of the program. These rules establish a strong incentive for program group
members to find full-time employment by the twelfth month of the experiment, and suggest that
any impacts observed near the end of the eligibility period may be close to an upper bound for
later impacts on full-time employment. If the main effect of SSP is to speed the transition from
welfare to work for those who eventually would find full-time employment anyway, then the
program impacts will tend to dissipate over time as control group members “catch up.” On the
other hand, if those receiving the SSP supplement stay employed longer than they would have
in the absence of the program, the impacts could grow over time. The expectation is that the
main effect of SSP will be to s@ the transition from welfare to work, so the impacts should
dissipate somewhat over time.
For purposes of this paper, information collected in the baseline interview artd 18-mortth
survey is used to determine labor market status on a month-by-month basis from 10 months
before program enrollment to 17 months after enrollment. ‘b Information is presented on five
labor market outcomes: total monthly earnings; monthly hours of work; an indicator for any
employment during the month (monthly hours of work greater than zero); an indicator for any
full-time employment during the month; and an indicator for any part-time employment during
l%e data are organiti in “experi~tal” months, rather than calendar months, kginning with the monlh of
random aaaignment. Complete labor mark~ data for the first 17 months of the program are available for all but
10 sample members who ~ndd to the 18-month survey. These 10 sample members are excluded from the monLh
17 Calculation.
-14-the month. Sin~ SSP eligibility is predicated on working at lmt 30 hours per week, full-time
employment is defined = working more than 130 hours in a month (30 hours per w=k times
4.33 weeh per calendar month), and part-time employment is defined as working 1to 129 hours
in a month. ”
Data from IA and SSP administrative records are used to measure four program
participation outmmes: an indicator for being on IA (receiving an IA payment during the month);
average monthly IA payments; an indicator for being on ei[her IA or SSP; and the sum of
average monthly LA and SSP supplement payments. Since these data are taken from
administrative ~rds, information is available for a slightly longer time frame — up to 23
months after mdom assignment.
The data are summarid in two ways. First, a series of graphs shows average monthly
outmmes for the program group and the control group, along with a monthly impact estimate.
This estimate is simply the difference in average outcomes betw=n the program group and the
control group. Given the randomized design, this impact estimate should be a valid indicator of
the program’s effect. Also shown as a test of the random assignment procedure are the outcomes
and estimated impacts for the 10 months before baseline. Under random assignment the
program impacts in the months before baseline should be close to zero, and statistically
significant only by chance.
In addition to the graphs of monthly outcomes, a table is presented showing employment
and welfare outmmes based on quarterly averages of the monthly outcomes from the first quarter
before baseline to the sixth quarter after the baseline. This table presents both unadjusted impact
estimates and adjusted estimates based on regression models that include 18 baseline covariates
and a dummy variable indicating membership in the program group. 18 Because of the
17me ~uimmt of 130 houm is ~tenti~]Y t~ strict because individuals who begin a full-time job tYPic~lY
work less than 130 hours in the month but can still raeive a partial SSP payment.
lame mvariat~ include the value of the dependent variable for the pre-baseline quarter; the ~ndent’s age;
number of children ages Oto 5, 6 to 12, and 13 to 18; number of adults over age 18 in the household; an indicator
(continued...)
-15-randoti design, adjusting for the effwts of baseline covtiates is not necessary to obtain valid
program estimates. However, the adjustment typically improves the precision of the estimated
impacts.
All the outwmes and impact estimates reportd in this wtion are based on the subsample
of individuals who responded to the 18-month survey (that is, the sample described in Table 2).
As we show in Section V~, below, an analysis of response patterns to the 18-month survey
suggests that non-response biases may lead to a slight overstatement of the SSP impacts in this
subsample. These ptenti biases should be kept in mind.
B, Program T-up
Before presenting the impact estimates. it is instructive to describe the extent of SSP
participation among the 942 program group members eligible for the supplement. ‘g Program
tti-q is not the same as program imps.cl bmause some program group members are “windfall”
beneficiaries -- that is, they would have worked full time in the absence of SSP and for them the
SSP supplement is simply a windfall. Indeed, the difference between the program take-up rate
and the actual experimental impact on the full-time employment rate is an estimate of the size
of the windfall group.
Figure 4 shows the fraction of the program group receiving SSP supplement payments
during each of the first 23 months of the program. The participation rate grows steadily for the
first 15 months, reaching a peak of 25 ~rcent by month 15. Thereafter, it drops off slightly and
18(.. .Wntinued)
for having ever worked before baseline; number of years of paid employment before baseline; dummy variables for
being a high =hool graduate or having some education in excess of high school; a dummy variable indicating
whether the ~ndent lived in subsidi~ housing at baseline; two dummy variabl= for the pr=nce of physical
or emotional problems at baseline; du~y variables for First Nation ancestr-y,European or Canadian ancestry, and
Asian an-try; and a variable indicating the number of months of IA receipt in the 36 months before baseline. In
a few cases, data were missing for some of the covariat~. Th~ were replti by sample means for the non-
missing cases. No re~ion-adjusted estimates are presented for quarter -1 because the outcome in quarter -1 is
used as one of the re~ion control variablw.
19Amore extended discussion of progmm take-up is presented in Mijanovich and brig, 1995.
-16-stabilizes at around 20 percent from months 19to 23. -use the first SSP supplement payment
muld be =ived as late as month 14, the drop-off after month 15 reflects job losses among
those who had earlier qualified for the supplement.
We emphasiu that the 25 percent take-up rate of the program group represents an upward
boti on SSP’S behavioral impact on full-time employment. Only if there are no windfall
recipients is the behavioral impact on the full-time employment rate equal to the program take-up
rate. To measure the true experimental effect we rely on the experimental design: under random
assignment the experiences of the control group provide a valid counterfactua.1 for the program
group’s behavior in the absenw of SSP. Thus differences betw=n the observed outcomes of the
program and control groups maure the behavioral impact of the SSP subsidy. In the remainder
of this ~tion we examine these impacts on. a variety of labor market and program-related
outcomes.
c. Unadjusted Monthly Impacts
Figures 5 to 9 show the average monthly labor market outcomes for the program and
control groups, along with the estimated SSP impacts in each month. Figures 10 to 13 present
similar data for welfare-related outcomes. For referenw, a vertical line in each graph separates
the pre-baseline period from the post-baseline period. As noted earlier, if random assignment
wu successful, the program group and conwol group outcomes should coincide during the pre-
baseline period. Inspection of the figures shows that, with the exception of the part-time
employment rate, the two groups’ outcomes were virtually identical during the pre-baseline
period.zo
A cursory look at the figures reveals another striking pattern. With the exception of the
part-time employment rate, all of the labor market outcomes show discrete jumps between month
201”hepart-timeemploymnt rate differenw are shtistically significant in 4 of the 12 months before b-line,
while the overatl employment rate differences are not statistically significant in any month before baseline. Lothe
month just before baseline, neither outcome’s difference is statistically significant.
-17--1 and month 1. For example, in Figure 5, average monthly earnings of the control group rise
about $50, while those of the program group rise about $70. The jumps in the labor outcomes
around the baseline are much larger than the changes betw=n any other pair of months, and are
not reflected by a corresponding jump in IA participation. We suspect that the jumps are due
to a “seam problem” arising from the fact that labor market data for month -1 are taken from the
baseline suwey, wherm labor market data for month 1 are taken from the 18-month sumey.
To investigate the reasons for the “jump” in employment and earnings around the baseline
period more fully, we calculated the number of new jobs starting in each month. This exercise
revealed an unusually large number of new jobs coded as starting in month 1. There are two
explanations for this phenomenon. One is that respondents were more likely to repofi “under-
the-table” jobs in the 18-month suney than in the baseline survey, leading to apparent job starts
in month 1 for jobs that were really held at baseline. Another is that recall errors, in
combination with particular features of the 18-month computer-assisted intemiew program, led
to measured job starts in month 1 for jobs that actually started somewhat later. Since there is
no evidence of a larger (or smaller) jump for progm group members relative to control group
members, however, we believe that the impact estimates are la.rgely unaffected by this apparent
seam problem.
The patterns for the control group in Figures 5 to 8 reveal a more-or-less steady trend
toward greater labor market activity in tie months following baseline. This trend is clearly
accelerated among the program group. The earnings impacts (Figure 5) are statistically
significant from months 5 through 17 and incrmse gradually from about $40 in month 5 to a
peak of about $140 in month 14. This is a sizeable impact (roughly 60 percent) relative to mean
earnings of the control group in the same month. During the last thrm months of the observation
window, the earnings of the program group dip slightly, while those of the control group
continue to rise, implying a d=line in the estimated program impact to around $100 per month
in month 17 (or roughly a 40 percent program-control group difference). Because eligibility for
-18-the SSP supplement ended at month 12, the employment impacts betw~n months 10and 14 may
be the largest impacts that will uur during the demonstration period.
Hours of work follow a pattern similar to earnings. The hours impacts (Figure 6) are
statistically significant in months 5 through 17, and rise gradually from around 6 hours per
month in month 5 to21 hours in month 14. Again, this is a sizeable impact (about a 70 percent
increase) mmpared to the mean hours of the control group. As with earnings, average hours of
work of the program group fall off after month 14, while hours of work of the wntrol group
rise, leading to a 15-hour differenw by month 17. If the earnings impacts are divided by the
corresponding hours impacts, the mtio tends to fall between $6.50 and $7.00. This suggests that
program group members we taking fairly low-paying jobs – only $1.00 to $2.00 per hour above
the minimum wage. In Section VI, below, more detailed information is presented on the wage
effects of the SSP program.
The overall employment rate (Figure 7) follows a pattern similar to earnings and hours.
The employment impacts are statistidly significant from months 6 through 17and rise gradually
to a peak impact of 14 percentage points in month 14 before falling slightly. As shown in
Figures 8 and 9, almost all of this impact is accounted for by a rise in full-time employment and
a drop in non-employment. Although simple economic models suggest that the SSP program
might reduce part-time work, this is not the case for the definition of part-time work depicted
in Figure 9. Other classifications of full- and part-time work based on a less stringent hours
criterion show a slightly more negative impact on part-time employment.
A comparison of SSP take-up rate among the program group with the experimental impact
on the full-time employment rate (i.e., figure 4 versus figure 8) suggests that a sizeable fraction
of SSP participants are “windfalls”. For example, the impact estimate in month 15 is 15 percent
while the take-up rate is 25 percent, implying that 10 percent of the program group received
windfall benefits from SSP. Thus, roughly thr~-fifths of SSP pticipants in the progmm group
were responding to the financial incentive, while about two-fifths would have worked full time
-19-anyway.
In light of the 30hour-per-w=k threshold imposed by the SSP eligibility rules, it is
interesting to ask whether there is a “clustering” of hours among SSP participants at aacf~ the
minimum level required for eligibility. 21 Throughout the entire post-baseline period, 21 percent
of program group members who were employed full time (i.e., working at least 130 hours per
month) averaged exactly 30 hours of work per week, compard to 13 percent of full-time control
group members. * An additioti 18 prcent of program group members who were employed
full-time worked exactly 35 hours ~r week, compared to 12percent of control group members.
Overall, some W percent of program group members who were employed full time worked less
than 40 hours per w=k, while only 45 percent of the control group members who were
employed full time worked less than 40 hours per w=k. Thus, there is some indication that
program group members are clustering at or near the 30-hour threshold, but a substantial number
are also working more.
As shown in Figures 10and 11, the impacts of the SSP program on IA receipt and average
IA payments mirror the impacts on employment. u From months 4 through 17, average IA
payments and the IA receipt rate decline faster for program group members than for control
group members. By month 17, the average IA payment for program group members is about
$130 less thm the average IA payment for control group members. ner~fter, the difference
closes slightly. The per~ntage of progmm group members who have left IA reaches a peak of
about 33 percent in month 17, and then levels off betwmn months 18 and 23. By comparison,
the percentage of the control group who have left IA follows a fairly steady upward trend. Thus,
21Ananalysis of federal and provincial tax and transfer program interactions with the SSP program suggests that
a substantial fraction of program group members face very high marginal tax rates when they work more than 30
hom per week. If individuals can freely choose their hours of work, this should lti to a con=ntration of hours
at exaetly the minimum eligibility level.
22Note that such conditional comparisons must be interpreted very carefully, and are not in general valid
estimatea of the cauaat effect of the SSP program.
‘Note W the IA status variable in Figure 11 is defined in teti of not receiving IA to permit aier
comparison with the employment outcome-a.
-20-SSP’S impact on IA r=ipiency peaks in month 15, and falls back to about 10 percentage points
by months 21 to 23. Because labor market information is not yet available beyond month 17,
we cannot determine whether the employment-relatd impacts exhibit a parallel decline after
month 18.
Our fti program impact wncems the sum of IA benefits and SSP supplement payments.
This mmbined outcome is of interest for at least two reasons. First, the sum of IA benefits and
SSP payments provides useful information about the overall cost of the SSP program. An
important question for the viability of SSP is whether the savings in welfare benefits generated
by the program are offset by the costs of the supplement, Second, a comparison of the SSP
impact on receipt of IA and its impact on the r~eipt of LAplus SSP provides another measure
of the relative size of the windfall group. In tie absence of any windfalls, the number of pple
who take up SSP will be qua.1 to the number who are induced to l=ve IA, and the fraction of
people who r~ive either IA or SSP in the program group will equal the fraction who receive
IA in the control group. If some supplement rmipients would have moved off IA anyway, then
tie fraction who r=eive either IA or SSP in the program group will exc~ the fraction who
receive IA in the control group.
As shown in Figure 12, the sum of average IA and SSP payments for the program group
is higher than average IA payments for the control group throughout the first 23 months of the
experiment. Moreover, the percentage of people receiving IA or SSP in the program group is
consistently higher than the percentage on IA in the control group (Figure 13). These findings
suggest that a si.zeablepercentage of people (roughly 10percent by month 20) receive supplement
payments under SSP, but would have moved off IA even in the absence of the program.
Supplement payments for this windfall group add to the costs of SSP without any corresponding
reduction in IA benefits. Consequently, by the second year of the experiment, average costs for
IA and SSP benefits in the program group are $80 to $100 dollars per month higher than the
average cost for IA benefits alone in the control group. A good portion (but not all) of these
-21-higher average rests are windfall benefits.
It is worth noting that tie mmbination of higher earnings and higher combined IA and SSP
payments among the program group imply substantially higher gross incomes than in the control
group. For example, in month 15, members of the program group had about $235 more in
monthly earnings and SSP/IA payments than members of the control group. This is a substantial
relative gain —roughly 23 percent of mean total earnings and IA benefits for the control group.
Thus, by month 15, SSP was having a substantial anti-poverty effwt.
D. Unadjusted and Adjwti Quarterly Im~ts
We turn now to a brief overview of the quarterly program impacts, and a comparison of
the unadjusted and adjusted impacts. Table 3 (panels A to I) presents quarterly averages of the
labor market and welfare-related outcomes of the control and program groups, along wifi
unadjusted and adjusted qua.rterly impacts. 24 The first thing to note about these results is the
similarity behveen the unadjusted artd adjusted impacs. The regression adjustments lead to some
modest increase in the precision of the impact estimates (lower standard errors), but have little
or no effect on the estimates themselves (with one exception noted below). A wend thing to
note is that none of the unadjusted impacts in the quarter before random assignment
are statistically significant. x In fact, in only one c- does the unadjusted impact
1 exceed its standard error.
(quarter -1)
in quarter -
The unadjusted and adjusted employment, earnings, and hours impacts (panels A to C) all
@in quarter 5 (months 13 to 15) and are statistically significant at the 5 percent level from
quarters 3 to 6. The maximum employment impact is 12 to 13 percentage points (about 40
percent of the control group mean), the maximum monthly earnings impact is $137, and the
maximum hours impact is 20 hours per month. The impacts on full-time employment (panel D)
2%e quarterly outim are simple averages of the underlying monthty figures, expressed as a monthly rate.
‘Adjusted impacts for quarter -1 are not computed kause one of tie covariatfi is the quarter -1 value of the
dependent variable.
-22-are virtually identical to the impacts on overall employment, but are much larger as a percentage
of the control group outcome. For example, the full-time employment impact in quarter 5 is
about 13 percentage points (or just over 100 prcent) of the control group mm for the quarter.
Although the unadjusted impacfi on part-time employment (panel E) are generally small
and statistically insignificant, the adjusted impacts are uniformly negative and are actually
statistically significant in quarters 2 and 6. Here, adjustment for the effects of covariates
(mainly, the part-time indicator for the pre-baseline quarter) makes a slight difference with
res~t to inferences about tie effect of the SSP program.
As suggested by Figure 11, the estimated impact of SSP on the IA r~eipt rate rises
throughout the first year and a half of the experiment (see panel F of Table 3), reaching close
to 14percentage points by qtier 6. Similarly, the impact on the average amount of IA benefits
r=ived (see panel G) rises steadily, ending with a net impact of $135 (or 18 percent of the
control group mean). Nevertheless, the presence of individuals who rmeive SSP but would have
moved off IA anyway results in a total combined r=ipt rate for IA and SSP that is actually 9
to 10 Perwntage points higher in the program group than in the control group (in panel H). The
estimated adjusted impacts on average IA and SSP costs (panel I) are $66 to $90 per month in
quarters 4 to 6 of the experiment.
v. Variation in the Impacts of SSP by Program Generosity
A. M~ of SSP Generosity
Even though the SSP demonstration is built around a single treatment, there are substantial
differences in the “generosity” of the SSP program across individuals in the research sample.
This variation arises for several reasons. First, individuals with higher wages receive lower SSP
benefits for the same amount of work (although their total income is higher). For example, an
individual in British Columbia working 30 hours per week at the minimum wage of $6.00 per
hour receives a monthly subsidy of $1,156 (with total monthly income of $1,935), whereas an
-23-individual who earns $10.00 per hour rweives a monthly subsidy of $899 (with total monthly
income of $2,198). Second, buse of different SSP target earnings levels in the two provinces,
two individuals with the same wage will receive a higher supplement in British Columbia than
in New Brunswick. Third, the generosity of the SSP program relarive to IA varies across single
parents because of variation in IA benefit rates by province and family size. Sin& most people
would be on IA in the absence of the SSP supplement offer, the difference in net incomes
betwen SSP and IA is a key determinant of behavioral responses to the program. Finally, the
relative generosity of SSP depends on individual-s~ific circumstan~s, such as child support
payments and non-wage income sources.2s
To assess the degree of variation in the generosity of the SSP supplement, we calculated
two measures of relative generosity. The first& based on a simple comparison between the total
earnings and supplement payments that an individual would receive working 30 hours per week
on SSP, versus the maximum monthly IA payment @ased on family size and province of
residence) that art individual would r~eive if not working. This measure makes no adjustments
for provincial or federal taxes or child tax credits, or for differences in other transfers that would
arise by moving off IA. The ~ond, more sophisticated measure is based on the estimated
differen~ in net inmmes between working 30 hours per wmk on the SSP program and working
30 hours per week on IA. This measure takes into account the differences in federal and
provincial taxes, refundable child tax credits, and child care subsidies, using detailed tax tables
and individual-s~ific information on family size, alimony and child support payments, aridother
income sources. For simplicity, the ~ond measure is estimated under the assumption that
British Columbia sample members would receive the standard earnings disregard ($200 per
261Abenefits are reduced dollar-fordollar by child support payments and by income from other family memkm,
whereas SSP ttenefits are inde~ndent of non-wage income or the incomes of other family members. Another source
of ptential variation in relative generosity ariw for people living in social housing, for which rent formulas exclude
IA inmrne but include eurnings and SSP hcome. For the sample and time period analyd in this paper, however,
SSP subsidies were excluded from the calculation of social housing rent.
-24-month) if on IA.*’
Both generosity mmures rquire an estimate of the gross hourly wage for individuals in
the research sample, Observed wages for sample members who worked in the pre-baseline
period (months -1 to -12) were used to estimate a standard human capital wage equation. We
employed a standard tw~step selection prtiure to account for possible non-randomness in the
subset of pre-baseline workers. Predicted wages were then assigned to all program group and
control group members, with the minimum wage assigned for anyone whose predicted wage was
below the provincial minimum wage.2*
Table 4 presents an overview of the alternative generosity measures. An initial analysis
revealed that much of the systematic variation in either generosity measure is accounted for by
only two factors: the provin~ of residence, and whether an individual has one or more than one
dependent chi.ld.29 Based on this fact, data ‘are presented for the four province/family size
subgroups shown across the columns of the table. Note that the groups based on family size
within each province are about qual in numbers (~ the last row of the table).
Rows 1 and 2 of Table 4 show average predicted wages for each province/family size
subgroup, and the fraction of wage predictions within $1.00 of the provincial minimum wage.
Predicted wages in New Brunswick are about 25 percent lower than in British Columbia, and are
more highly con~ntrated just above tie minimum wage, Row 3 shows the fraction of ach
group who were working at baseline. This is fairly similar across subgroups, although sample
members in New Brunswick with one child have a slightly higher baseline employment rate than
the other groups.
Rows 4 through 7 present information on the simple generosity measure, which compares
*’Details of the ulculations are available from the authors on rquest.
2abdividuals working in subminimum wage jobs do not qualify for an SSP supplement. Details of the wage
imputation prdure are available from the authors.
29Two-thirds of the variation in the simpler generosity measure and 45 pereent of the variation in the more
mmplex measure is explained by th= variables. The correlation of the wo generosity m~res across individuals
is 0.68.
-25-gross pay on SSP at 30 hours of work per week to the statutory IA benefit, assuming zero hours
of work. A mmparison across subgroups revds that while IA benefits are higher for larger
families (especially in British Columbia), predicted earnings and SSP supplements are about the
same. Thus, the relufive generosity of the SSP program is smallest for larger families in British
Columbia. In absolute terms, SSP is most generous for families with one child in British
Columbia. If generosity is expressed as a fraction of the basic IA benefit level, however (as in
row 7), SSP is most generous for small families in New Brunswick.
Rows 8 to 10 present similar information using the more complex generosity measure
based on net (that is, after tax and transfer) income comparisons at 30 hours per week.
Consideration of taxes and transfers leads to a notable reduclion in the apparent generosity of the
SSP program across family siu categories, mainly because of the higher transfers and tax credits
available on IA.30 Nevertheless, the ranking of relative generosity across the four family
sire/province subgroups is similar: SSP is least generous for single parents with two or more
dependents in British Columbia, and most generous for single parents in New Brunswick with
one child.
B. Variation in SSP Impacts
In light of the variation in relative generosity of the SSP program by province and family
size, and the theoretical prediction from simple labor supply models that the SSP impact should
vary by the relative generosity of the program, it is interesting to compare SSP impacts across
provinces and within provinces between individuals with larger and smzdler families. As a first
step in this comparison, statistical tests were performed to determine whether the SSP impacts
on the outcomes analyzed in Table 3 were different for British Columbia and New Brunswick.
In no case were the differenws statistically significant, although the labor market outcomes
3%ven ~unting for taxes and transfers, SSP yields a higher net income than IA
week) for all but a handful of individuals with very large families in British Columbia.
-26-
(at 30 hours of work perexhibit somewhat different patterns over time for program and control group members in the two
provinus. Specifically, whereas earnings of the British Columbia control group rise steadily
from baseline, earnings of the New Brunswick control group show a pronounced “dip” betw=n
months 7 and 14, One explanation for this pattern is the highly seasonal nature of employment
in this province. 31 Among the program group in New Brunswick, however, there was no
evidence of such a dip, suggesting that the program group may have taken more stable jobs to
ensure continuing supplement eligibility.
Although average SSP impacts are not very different between British Columbia and New
Brunswick, a closer lcx)k at the differences by family size in the two provinces reveals an
interesting pattern. Table 5 summarizes the average monthly labor market impacts by quarter
for the four family size/provinu subgroups. For simplicity’s sake, only unadjusted program
impacts for three key outcomes are reported: average hours of work, average earnings, and the
overall employment rate. 32 Despite the fact that SSP is least generous for individuals in British
Columbia with larger families, the data in Table 5 suggest that the program had its largest impact
on this subgroup, Indeed, the earnings, hours, and employment impacts in quarters 5 and 6 for
single parents with two or more dependent children in British Columbia are roughly fwice u.s
large as the comesponding impacts for any other subgroup.33 While not shown in the table,
the larger labor market impacts for this subgroup are partially reflectd in lower welfare
participation rates. In quarter 6, the (unadjusted) difference in the percentage on IA betw=n the
program group and the control group is -19. I prcent for the British Columbia subgroup with
3‘Intake for the New Brunswick ~h sample was concentrated in the period from November 1992 to April
1993. Hen-, experi-tal months 7 to 14correspond (on average) to calen&r months August 1993 to April 1994.
321mpact eati- derived from tigreasion models sirnilar to the onea used for the adjusted impac@ in Table
3 are very close to the unadjusted impacts. Outcomes of the program group and wntrol group in each
province/family sim subgroup were also checked to determine whether they differed in the pre-baseline quarter: In
all ~, differen- are small and statistically insignificant.
33 Formal twta of the hypotheis tit the SSP labor market impacts are the same for larger British Columbia
families as for all other subgroups are rejected at the 5 percent level for quatiers 5 and 6.
-27-two or more children, versus an average impact of -13.8 perunt (~ Table 3, panel F).34
In light of the relatively small sample sizes in the first cohort of the SSP research sample,
it is difficult to rach any strong conclusions about the variation in program impacts across
subgroups. By the same token, the SSP demonstration was not explicitly designed to test the
effects of different generosity levels, and the variation in generosity indud by family size and
inkrprovincial differen~s is limited. Nevertheless, we tentatively conclude that there is no
strong relationship between simple measures of program generosity and the magnitude of the
prog- impacts. If anything, the program resprtses seem to be largest for British Columbia
parents with more children, a group for whom tie SSP
conventional IA. It will be interesting to see whether
longer time frames, and for the entire SSP sample.
program is relatively less generous than
these conclusions continue to hold over
to the SSP incentive, it is interesting
VI. Measurin g Wage Outimes A~ with SSP
Having measured significant employment responses
to try to characterize the wages of the “net jobs” generated by the program. Conventional
models of the work-welfare decision suggest hat these net jobs should be disproportionately
drawn from the low end of the wage distribution. According to these models, individuals who
fa~ relatively low-wage opportunities are further from the margin betwmn working and staying
on welfare, and are less likely to work in the absence of a supplement. By comparison,
individuals with better wage opportunities might be expected to leave IA even without the SSP
supplement: For them, the SSP program is more likely to serve as a windfall. Empirical
confirmation of these predictions would provide some evidence that low wages are a prim~
reason for continuing welfare participation. It is also interesting to ask whether program
participants who are indud to work by the SSP supplement will move up the wage distribution
3%e differen~ in the impact of SSP on larger British Columbia families versus its overall impact on 1A
participation in quarter 6 is just significant at the 5 percent level.
-28-u they ~umulate work experiena. With the limited data currently available, only a
preliminary look can be taken at this important question. In subquent research, data will be
used over a longer time frame to study the extent of wage progression among supplement takers.
Table 6 presents a variety of comparative information on the distributions of wages among
the program group and the control group. To handle interprovincial wage differences using the
pooled sample, wages are normalized relative to the minimum wage in the appropriate province.
For example, a wage of $6.50 is $1.50 above the minimum wage of $5.00 in New Brunswick,
but only $.50 above the minimum wage of $6.00 in British Columbia. Using this approach,
35less than the minimum wage; wage outwmes were divided into six categories: missing wage;
up to $.99 above the minimum wage; $1.00 to $1.99 above the minimum wage; $2.00 to $2.99
above the minimum wage; and more than $3.00 above the minimum wage. The resulting wage
distributions for month 13 (that is, the first month after the close of the eligibility period for
program group members to initiate a supplement) and month 17 (the last month for which data
are available) are shown in Table 6.
The first row of each panel shows the percentages of individuals in the program group and
control group who were not working. In the overall sample, 58.8 percent of the program group
were not working in month 13, comptied with 72.4 percent of the control group. The difference
– 13.6 percentage points + is the unadjusted program impact on the employment rate. The
remaining rows of the table pertain to s~ific wage intervals, including the missing wage
category (row 2). A comparison of columns 1 and 2 shows the “excess fraction” of jobs for the
36 For example, in month 13, 13.9 percent of the progmm group in a particular wage interval.
program group held a job that paid up to $.99 above the minimum wage ($6.00 in British
Columbia and $5.00 in New Brunswick), compared with 5.8 percent of the control group. The
difference (8. 1 prcentage points) is an estimate of the SSP program effect on the percentage of
351nformation on wag~ was missing for some individuals who may have b working in casuat or piece-rate
jobs with wmpensation that cannd be easily converted to an hourly wage.
36Note that fractions in each wage internal reflect all individuals, not just those who held a job.
-29-pple who held a minimum-wage-t&$ .99-above-the-minimum wage range in month 13.
By construction, the sum of the differences in each wage internal betw~n the program
group and the mntrol group is equal to the overall difference in employment rates between the
groups. Dividing the difference in the percentage employed in a pardcular wage intenal by the
overall difference in employment rates therefore gives the fraction of “net jobs” created by the
SSP supplement in that wage internal. For example, in month 13, jobs in the minimum-to-
minimum-plus-$.99 range internal accounted for 8.1 percentage points of the total 13.6
percentage point increase in employment, or 59.6 percent of the net jobs. Following this
procedure, the distribution of net jobs was constructed across all the wage intervals, as shown
in column 3 of Table 6.37 Note that there cart be a negative entry in this column if a smaller




This may happen if the SSP supplement induces some people who would have held a
particular wage intema.1 to find a job in a different wage interval. For example,
in New Brunswick may forgo a relatively high-wage job in the fishing industry for a
steadier low-wage job in the se~ice industry, to ensure her continuing eligibility for SSP.
If the SSP program generates jobs that are “just like” those held by workers in the control
group, then the distribution in column 3 will be qual to the conditional distribution of wages for
workers in the control group. On the other hand, if the SSP program induces some pple with
relatively low-wage opportunities to find jobs, then the distribution in column 3 will have more
jobs in low-wage intervals than the distribution of wages for working controls. Column 4 gives
the difference between the fraction of net jobs attributable to SSP in a particular wage interval
(that is, column 3) and the fraction of control group jobs in the same interval (that is, the entry
in column 2 divided by the fraction of control group members with a job).
37Formatly, la f~ repwnt the fraction of the entire control ~mple in wage interval j (including non-workers).
Similarly, la f! represent the fraction of the program group in interval j. Finally, let f 5 and f ~ represent the
non-working titions of the control group and program group. Then the fraction of net jobs attributable to jobs in
wage inteIvat j is ( f! - f;) / ( f~ - ft ). Standard errors for this fraction can be constructed by the delta method.
-30-The resulfi for month 13 suggest that about 60 percent of the net jobs attributable to SSP
paid within $.S9 per hour of the minimum wage, and another 30 percent paid from $1.00 to
$1.99 per hour above the minimum wage. These wages are relatively low compared to the
distribution of wages for control group members who were working in the same monti, of whom
36 percent were earning at lat $3.00 per hour above the minimum wage.3* Consistent with
the predictions horn simple mrtomic models of welfare participation, it seems that
who are induced to move off IA and into employment by the SSP supplement tend
with relatively low-wage opportunities.
individuals
to be those
There is no evidence of a program effwt on the probability of holding a job that pays less
than the minimum wage, which is r~ssunng since individuals holding jobs below the minimum
wage are ineligible for a supplement. However, the SSP program seems to lead to a modest
reduction in the fraction of individuals with a missing wage. One explartation for this apparent
effect on missing-wage jobs is that SSP eligibility rules lead some workers who would otherwise
work in casual or pi~-rate jobs with compensation that cannot be easily converted to an hourly
wage to find jobs for which hourly wages can be easily calculated. Similarly, it is possible that
the SSP supplement I=ds program group members to choose lower-wagejobs —perhaps because
higher-wage jobs have less predictable hours. In any case, the sampling errors for the percentage
of net jobs in the missing-wage category are relatively large, so any apparent shortage of such
jobs among the program group must be interpreted cautiously.
The wage distributions for month 17 (the last month for which labor market data are
available) are fairly similar to the distributions for month 13. In comparing these distributions,
it must be kept in mind that while the net employment impact of SSP in month 13 was 13.6
3%s co- from dividing the 10.0 percent of control group mernbrs earning $3.00 or more above the
minimum wage by the Pe=ntage of working control group members (27,6 percent), yielding 36.2 percent of
working mnt rol group membrs ting at least $3.00 above the minimum wage.
-31-perunt, the net impact in month 17 was only 7.5 Wrcent. A smaller fraction of the progmm
group was working in month 17 than in month 13, whereas a slightly larger fraction of the
control group was worting in the later month. Although it is possible that these changes might
have caused a rightwa.rd shift in the distribution of wages for the net jobs attributable to the SSP
program, this does not ap~ to be the case.39 There is certainly no evidenm of relative wage
progression in the program group between months 13 and 17, Of course, the four-monti
difference is probably fm too short to measure any reasonable degr~ of wage progression.w
Two main conclusions can be drawn from these analyses. First, wages for the jobs tiat
can be attributed to the SSP supplement tend to be clusterd near the bottom of the wage
distribution. This pattern is consistent with conventional economic models of welfare
participation that suggest that many individuals rationally chmse to receive IA rather than work
because their wage opportunities are relatively constrained. Second, based on the very limited
comparison of months 13 and 17 after random assignment, no evidence is found that the
distribution of wages for the net jobs attributable to the SSP program has shifted upward over
time.
VII. Evrdtig the ~ti of Non-Response to the 18-Month Survey
Up to this point our analyses have kn conducted on the subset of the SSP research
sample who completed the 18-month sumey. As noted earlier, about 10 percent of the sample
either could not be located or refused to respond to the sumey. Although no survey-based data
are available for the non-respondents, IA and SSP administrative r=ords allow comparisons
between pple who responded to the 18-month survey and those who did not. In this section,
391flarger SSP employment impacta are generated by drawing more low-wage workers into employment, then
the net jobs attributable to the progm” will have lower wages in periods with a larger employment impact. On the
other hand, the additiod control group rnembem employed in month 17 might have had higher-than-average wages,
so that month 17 has both a smaller impact and a greater percentage of net jobs in the low-wage internals.
%- on wnventiod ~timates of human capital earnings functions, one might expect onty a 2 to 5
pe~tage point inc~ in wagm for each year of experienw in the labor market, or less than a percentage point
of wage growth in four months.
-32-the patterns of non-response are described and an attempt is made to evaluate the effects of non-
response bias on the estimates of the SSP program impacts.
A. Analyti of R~nse Rates
Table 7 shows the per~ntages of individuals in the first cohort of the SSP research sample
who completed the 18-month suwey, by research group, by province, and by whether the
individual was r~iving IA payments in month 18.41 Row 1 of the table contains response
rates for the overall sample and for the control and program groups. As shown in mlumn 4, the
control group had a 3.3 per=rttage point higher response rate, and this difference is statistically
significant at mnverttional levels. Response rates were slighdy higher in New Brunswick than
in British Columbia (see rows 2 and 3), although the difference in response rates between the
program group and the control group was very similar in the two provinces.
Different response rates for the progmm group and the control group do not necessarily
imply any bim in the comparison of outcomes betwwn respondents in the two groups. IndA,
if respc)nse probabilities were constant within groups and independent of other characteristics,
then the differences in measured outcomes of tie survey respondents would provide unbiased
estimates of the true program effect. As shown in rows 4 to 6 of Table 7, however, response
rates within the program and control groups vary by 1Astatus at the time of the suwey. Within
the control group, IA raipients at month 18 were more likely than non-recipients to respond to
the survey. Within the program group, however, 1Armipients and non-recipients had about the
same response rates. Since IA r-ipients are over-represented among controls in the respondent
sub=mple, but not among the program group in the respondent subsample, the gap in IA receipt
rates betw=n the program and control groups in the respondent subsample overstates the true
41Note that IA and SSP administrative &ta are used for both r~pondents and non-respondents to the 18-month
survey. The Hits in Table 7 are very similar if res~nse rates are compati by IA status in any particular month
ktween 15 md 20 months after random assignment.
-33-difference for the entire sample.42
The higher response rate for IA recipients over non-recipients in the control group could
be due to a number of factors, including: (1) Some non-IA r~ipients may have moved out of
provinm, whereas IA r~ipients are all in-province; (2) IA recipients are less likely that to have
undergone a change in their living arrangements or labor market status, making it less likely that
they have changed addresses within province; (3) non-IA recipients may feel less obligation to
respond to a survey than those who are still receiving LA. In principle, all of these factors should
have a similar effect on relative respnse rates in the program group. On the other hand, two
other considerations may depress the relative response rate of IA rwipients in the program group.
First, since the SSP supplement moves some people from welfare to work, those who remain on
IA may be disproportionately unresponsive to the request for information (a “selection” effect).
S=ond, because individuals in the program group were repeatedly contacted with information
about the supplement, those who remained on IA may have become tired of defending their
choice (a “harassment” effect) .43
While it is difficult to precisely measure the relative contributions of the selection and
hmsment effects, a lower bound on the harassment effwt can be calculated by assuming full
response among the Selwt group leaving IA for SSP. In other words, suppose that all the people
in the program group who were moved off IA by the SSP program would have responded to the
18-month suwey. Based on the IA receipt rate in the control group, this would account for an
42Formally, la p(IA IC) and p(IA IE) represent the probability of IA receipt among the control and program
groups. The tme experimental impact on IA receipt is p(IA ~E) - p(IA IC), LetR denote the event of ~ponding to
the 18-month survey. Then the ~ed impact in the respondent subaample is
p(IA~R,E) - p(IA~R,C) = p(IAl E)~(R~ IA,E)/p(R~ E) - p(IAl C)~(Rl IA,C)/p(R~ C).
Sin= response rat= for IA recipienk and non-mipients are about quat in the program group,
p(R IIA,E)/p(R IE) = 1, while p(R IIA,C)/p(R ~C) > 1, implying a downward bias (that is, a larger negative
YE) in P(MI R,E) - P(IAI R,C) relative to p(IAIE) - p(IA~C).
43Alternatively, some program group members who tried unsuccessfully to find full-time employment may have
become so di~uraged that they refused to be interviewed.
-34-additional 124 respondents on IA in the program group,” implying an overall response rate of
90.2 per~rtt for program group members who would have been on IA in the absen~ of the
program. Sin@ the response rate in the control group for IA recipients was 93.3 percent, a
“lower bound” estimate is that the harassment eff~t reduced the response rate for IA rmipients
in the program group by 3.1 Wrcentage pints.
Further analysis of response rates for members of the program group who were not on IA
reveals that those who r~ived a supplement payment in month 18 had a relatively high response
rate (94.5 percent). Averaging the response rates for IA recipients and SSP supplement takers,
the overall response rate for program group members who received any form of payment (either
SSP or IA) was 89.8 percent. By comparison, the response rate for those who received neither
IA nor a supplement payment was 78.9 percent. The relative response rate for program group
members who r~ived any form of payment (IA or SSP) versus those who received nothing is
therefore similar to the relative differential for IA recipients and non-recipients in the control
group: For both groups, people who received some form of payment are over-represented in the
respondent subsample. It follows
SSP) in the respondent subsample
that the estimated
is an overestimate
program impact for total receipt (IA plus
of the true program impact.
B. ~g the Sign and Magnitude of Non-Response Bias
Because IA and SSP supplement payment data are obtaind from administrative records,
non-response in the 18-month survey is not a problem for estimating the impact of the SSP
supplement on the IA and SSP outcomes. For such outcomes as the probability of working,
however, the 18-month su~ey is the only source of data. Furthermore, since IA and SSP
supplement status are mechanically correlated with labor market outcomes, and since response
rates vary by program status and IA/SSP supplement status, one might expect respnse rates to
%e IA receipt rate in the control group in month 18 wu 0.7917, while the rate in the progmm group was
0.6754. Since the control group sample comprises 1,066 individuals, 124 (= 1,066*[0.79 17-0.67545]) ~ple were
moved off IA by the program.
-35-vary by progm status and employmem status, leading to biases in tie estimated program
impacts for all the labor market outwmes discussed in Swtion IV.
One way to evaluate the effwt of this bias is to assume hat response rates for the 18-
month suwey depend only on program status and IA or SSP supplement status as of month 18.
It is then possible to simply “reweight” the labor market outcome data for each subgroup (say,
mntrol group members who were on IA in month 18) by the inverse of their response
probabilities, and calculate adjusted estimates of the mean labor market outcomes for the program
group and rhe antrol group. While this assumption is probably tm strong, it nevertheless
captures some of the m=surable variation in response rates, and gives some indication of the
likely sign and magnitude of non-response bias.
Table 8 illustrates the application of this idea to the observed IA and combined IA and SSP
receipt rate outcomes of the program and control groups. For each quarter, three estimates of
a particular outcome are presented: an estimate based on the overall sample, including non-
respondents to the 18-month survey (labeled the “all” sample); an estimate based on the
unweighed average for respondents to the 18-month suney (labeled the “unweighed” wmple);
and an estimate based on a weighted average of the data for respondents to the 18-month survey
(labeled the “weighted” sample). The inverse response probabilities are used as weights for six
groups defined by IA and SSP status in month 18: control group members on IA; control group
members off IA; program group members on IA who did not rweive an SSP supplement
payment; program group members who were off IA and received an SSP supplement payment;
program group members who received both IA and an SSP supplement payment; and program
group members who received neither IA nor an SSP supplement payment.
The first half of the table shows the percentages receiving IA in each quarter and the
estimated program impacts. As expected given the response patterns in Table 7, the unweighed
averages from the 18-month survey respondents overstate the fraction of IA recipients in the
control group in quarters 1 to 6, I=ding to downward-biased
-36-
estimates of the progmm impacts.The weighting procedure “wrrects” the IA rtieipt rates for non-response biases and gives rise
to program impacts that are very close to the estimates based on the full sample.
In general, the same bmic pattern emerges in the second half of the table, where data are
presented on combined IA and SSP receipt. The weighted averages using only the survey
respondent subsa.mple tend to be closer to the overall averages than the simple unweighed
averages. However, the estimated program impacfs based on the unweighed averages for the
respndent subsarnple tend to be slightly closer to the averages based on the full sample. The
non-response biases in the unweighed means for the program and control groups effectively
“difference out, ” leading to almost no bias in the program impacts from the unweighed data.
Table 9 shows what happens when the =me weighting pr~edures are applied to two of
the estimated labor market outcomes (employment and mings). In these cases, however, no
estimates are available from the overall sample to compare against the weighted or unweighed
averages from the respondent subsample. The weighting adjustments tend to raise the average
outcomes for the mntrol group members and lower the average outcomes for the program group
members, lading to slightly smaller program impacts than arise from the unweighed data.
These adjustments reflect the patterns of non-response in the two groups. In the control group
sample, people who are off IA are under-represented. Since these tend to be people with better
labor market outcomes (more hours, higher earnings), the weighting adjustment raises the mean
outcomes for the control group, In the program group sample, however, pple who are on IA
have relatively low response rates (no higher than those off IA), while those who are rweiving
an SSP supplement have very high response rales. Since ~ple who receive a supplement are
n~ssarily working full time, the weighting adjustment lowers the hours, earnings, and
employment rate of the program group. The net effect of the two adjustments lowers the
estimated program impacts on tie probability of working, average monthly hours, and average
monthly earnings by about 10 percent.
Two main conclusions can be drawn based on this analysis. First, experimental impacts
-37-derived from the subsample who responded to the 18-month survey overstate the effect of the
SSP supplement on IA =ipt rates, but (very slightly) understate the effwt of the supplement
on the combined IA and SSP =ipt rate. Second, and more tentatively, non-response biases in
the 18-month survey probably lead to an overstatement of the SSP supplement’s net impact on
labor market outimes such as the probability of working or earnings. The magnitude of the
bias is perhaps 10 perwnt. Thus, if the measured impact on the probability of working, using
the 18-month sumey data, is 11 percentage points, the true impact is probably about 10
peruntage points.
VIII. Conclusions
As in most other counties, welfare expenditures and caseloads in Canada have risen over
the past several dmdes, placing growing fiscal strains on federal, provincial, and local
governments. It has long been argued that a key to reducing welfare dependency is to provide
gainful employment opportunities for welfare r~ipients. Previous efforts at stimulating
employment have utilized a vtiety of approaches, most of which have enjoyed moderate success.
In this paper, we have presented early findings from a unique social experiment being conducted
in two very different sites in Canada (lower mainland British Columbia and southern New
Brunswick) that offers a generous financial incentive for long-term welfare recipients to find a
full-time job and leave welfare. To our knowledge, this is the first time such an approach has
been subjected to a formal test and evaluation.
The early findings from the Self-Sufficiency Proj-t indicate that a significant number of
single parents respond to the program’s financial incentives by taking full-time jobs. In fact,
after 14 months, the fraction of welfare recipients working full time among those who were
offered the SSP earnings supplement is about twice that of a randomly assigned control group.
There is no strong evidence that the impact of the SSP supplement differs systematically by the
generosity of SSP relative to the alternative of remaining in the IA program, although small
-38-sample sizes and the” single treatment” design of the demonstration make it difficult to draw firm
conclusions. There is some eviden=, however, that the program impact is higher for larger
families in British Columbia.
Although the SSP supplement lads to an increase in full-time employment, it appears that
r=ipients are taking jobs that pay relatively low wages —within $1.00 to $3.00 per hour above
the minimum wage. This is consistent with the view that many long-term welfare recipients have
low wage opportunities. Unless the SSP participants experience substantial wage growth in their
three years of program eligibility, it is conceivable that many recipients will return to welfare
when the supplement ends.
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Monthly Income for a Single Parent with One Child in British Columbia
UnderIA(with the Basic Earnings Disregard)
and Under SSP, at the Minimum Wage of $6 Per Hour
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Figure 3
Monthly Income for a Single ParentwithOneChildin New Bmnswick
Under IA and Under SSP, at the Minimum Wage of $5 Per Hour
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Selected Cbaracteriatia of the British Columbia and New Brunswick
Labour Markets, IA Program, and SSP Earnings Supplement Program
British New
Characteristic Columbia Brunswick Canada
Basic labor market
Addt popdatiou 1994 (thousands) 2,869 594 22,717
Employinent/popdation rate
1992 59,4 51.5 58.1
1993 59.9 51.8 58,2
1994 60.4 51.7 58.5
Unemployment rate
1992 10.4 12.8 11.3
1993 9.7 12,6 11.2
1994 9,4 12,4 10,4
Proportion of families below low-income cutoff’
1992
1993
mum wage (1994, $~our)












grant for single parents (S)b 1,079 733
SSP Earninw SuDr.)iementPro-am
SSP break-even ($/month)’ 3,083 2,500
Minimum montiy earnings for
SSP eligibility 780 650 ..
Momb.ly earnings and SSP supplement
assuming minimum wage and 30 hotiweek 1,932 1,575
~tio: SSP income (earnings plus supplement)flA
grant (Y.) (row 10/row 7) 179,1 214.9
SOURCES: Basic labor- dataarehorn Perspectives on Labour and Income, Summer
1994 and Summer 1995 editions. Employment/popdation mtes are computed from
popdation and emplownt statistics. Average monthly earnings of female workers is
co~cted by dividing annual earnings for full-time W-year female workers in 1993 by 12.
IA program data are from the British Columbia Ministry of Social Sefflces and
tie Department of Human Resources Development - New Brunswick. The rate for New
Brunswick is for the Upgrading, Training, and Placement program.
NOES: ~ow-income cutoffs (LICOS) are earnings levels determined and utilized by Statistics
Canada to identify low-income f~y units. LICOS are etimated as the income level at which a
family spends 20 percentage points more than the Canadian average on f~ shelter, and cloting.
bAverage of rates for single parents with one and two children.
%e level of monthly _gs beyond which the SSP supplement is O.
‘Sum of monthly earnings assuming 30 hours of work per week at the minimum wage,
plUSSSP subsidy wual to Wthe Werence between the t.~oet fi,mk-,..~ ---;..=Table 2: Mearm of Selected Characteristics: Overei[, By Provime, ad By progrmn Grq
t-atetistic
Controls Progr- for di f ferme:
Wera( i Be Mly NB Ofliy On(y only Progrm-Controls














































12. Pet. Mother Di&’t 65.4
Finish High Schoola (1.1)
13. Pet. Father Di*’t 66.4
Finish High Schoola (1.1)
14. Pet. Had Both 59.8
Parenta in H- (1.1)
15. Pet. Fmily~ 23.3
1A as Child (1.0)
Fmilv Structural
16. Total N-r of 1.5
Ch i ldren (0.0)
17. N-r of Chiidrsn 0.7

























































































































































Note: Statird l rrora of means in parentheses. A(( characteristics are measured aa of Baseline
Intervieu mleas otheruise indicated. Entry in co~um (6) is the t-statistic for a teat
that the mean is the same for the cmtro( group and program group.
Table contima . . . .t-statistic
Controls Progrmns for differ-e:
Wernl 1 EC m(y MB mty only m(y Programs-Controls
(1) (2) (3) (6) (5) (6)
18. Percent *O N- 95.1
Sores Chi[dcare (0.5)
19. Percent Divorcd, 53.6
Separated, Ui* (1.2)
20. Percent Never 44.6
Married (1.2)
21. Percent OWI HaIU 6.3
(0.6)
22. Percent Receiving 22.6
Housing S~idy (1.0)
1A HistoryL
23. Nhr of Months 29.7
on IA Last 3 Yrs. (0.2)
24. Percent Current 60.5
IA Spell ~ 2 Yrs. (1.1)
25. IA Received Last 886.4
Month (S) (7.1)
Uork Histor~
26. Perc~t Ever 94.8
Had Paid Job (0.5)
27. N-r Years of 7.4
E~[o~t (0.2)
28. Ntir of Months 1.8
Hork4 Last 10 Ho. (0.1)
29. Avg. Earnings per 107.2
Month Last 10 Ho. (6.1)
30. Percmt Wrkd 18.3
Last Month (0.9)
Location:
31. Percent Urh 90.0
Location (0.7)








































































































































Note: Standard errors of mane in parentheses. A( [ characteristics are measured as of Baseline
Intervien mless otherwise itiicated. Entry in colum (6) is the t-statistic for a test
that the men is the s- for tha control group ad program group.
alncludee individuets uho report that parent did not finish high school as ue(l as those
Aoae prental educat im data are missing.Table 3
Quatierly Outcomes and Program Impacts of SSP for the 18-Month Survey Sample
Outcome Measure Program Control Unadjusted Adjusted
and Time Period Group Group Impact Impact






























































































































Outcome Measure Prow Control Unadjusted Adiuted
and Time Period Group Group Impact - Impact

































































































D. Percentage who worked full time
















Outcome Measure Program Control Umdjusted Adjusted
and Time Period Group Group Impact Impact
E. Average percentage who worked pati time
































































































































Outcome Measure Program Control Umdjusted Adiusted
and Time Period Group Group Impact Impact


















































































































Outcome Measure Pro- Control Unadjusted Adjusted
and Time Period Group Group Impact Impact
L Average monthly IA and










































Quarter 6 86.3 * 84.5 *
(19.2) (16.7)
Sarnule size 942 968
SOURCE: SRDC’S18-month survey of the first cohort of SSP sample members.
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
An asterisk indicates that the impact estimate is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
The unadjusted impact is the simple tierence in mean outcomes between the program
and control groups. The adjusted impact is a regression-adjusted Uerence, controlling for the
lagged (quarter -1) value of the dependent variable; age; province; number of children in three age
ranges; nmber of addts in the household; a dummy if the person ever worked for pay; the number
of years of paid work before baseline; dummies for two levels of schooling (high school graduation
with no post-seeon~ education and some post-secondary education); dummies for the presence
of self-reported physical or emotional problems at baseline: a dummy for subsidized housing at
baseline; dummies for First Natiou European or Camdian, or Asian antes@; a dummy for being
born outside of Canada; and a m~ of the number of months on IA in the three years before
baseline.Table 4
Relative Generosity of SSP by Province and FarnilY Size for the 18-Month Survey Sample
British Columbia New Brunswick
2 or More 2 or More
Measure 1 Child Children 1 Child Children
1. Predicted hourly wage ($) 7,49 7,38
2. Predictions within $1.00 of minimum wage (%) 40.4 45,6
3, Working at baseline (VO) 16.6 17,4





Average statutory 1Aamount at Ohours
of work per monthb ($) 982 1,231
Earnings plus supplement under SSP at
130 hours of work per month ($) 2.028 2,021
Additional income: SSP at 130 hours
minus statuto~ IA ($) 1,046 790
Additional income/lA (row 6/row 4) ($) 1.07 0.64





Average disposable income under IA
at 130 hours of work per month ($) 1,601 2,233
Average disposable income under
SSP at 130 hours of work per month ($) 2,071 2.550
Additional income: SSP at 130 hours of
work per month minus IA ($) 470 317












Sample size 619 645 337 309
SOURCE: SRDC’S18-month survey of the first cohort of SSP sample members.
NOTES: “Calcr.dations ignore federaI and provincial ta~cs and other transfers.
bAverage monthly IA payment at Ohours of }~orkISbased on family size, and ignores any
allowances or reductions.
CCalcdations are based on disposable income. assuming that the individti works 130
hours per month, and account for federal and provincial taxes and tax credits, child support payments,
payroll taxes, and applicable child care subsidies. Averages are based on program group subsamples
only.Table 5
Average Monthly SSP Program Impacts by Province and
Family Size for the SSP 18-Month Suwey Sample
British Columbia New Brunswick
Measure and 2 or More 2 or More
Follow-Up Periti 1 Child Children 1Child Children














































































































Bntlsh Columbla New Brunswck
Measure and 2 or More 2 or More
Follow-Up Period 1 Child Ctuldren 1Ctuld Ctuldren
Average monthlv emDlovment rate (o/o]
Quaner 1 -4.8 7,6 5.7 -3.2
(3.3) (3.1) 4.8 (4.4)
~er 2 4.7 10.5 5.9 -0.5
(3.4) (3.2) (4.9) (4,7)
Quarter 3 0.0 13.8 6,3 6.8
(3.6) (3,3) (4.9) (4.9)
Quarter 4 4,2 14.2 11.5 l 13.3 l
(3,6) (3.4) (5,0) (4.8)
~er 5 9,3 l 19.7 10.7 l 9.8 l
(3.7) (3.5) (5.1) (5.0)
Quarter 6 2.5 18,0 5.9 4.7
(3.7) (3.5) (5.2) (5.1)
SOURCE: SRDC’S18-mont.h survey of the first cohort of SSP sample members,
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
An asterisk indicates ht the impact estimate is statistically significant at the 5 percent level
Impacts are unadjusted differences in quarterly averages of monthly outcomes between
proflam group and control group members in each subsample.Table 6
Analysis of Wage Distribution of Jobs Attributable to SSP, Both Provinces
Percentage in Intervala Percentage Excess Share
Program Control of Net Jobs of Net Jobs
Wage Interval Group Group in Intervalb in Interval (“A)’





3. Less than minimum wagee
4. Minimum to minimum + $,99
5, Minimum+ $1.00-$1.99 above minimum
6, Minimum+ $2.00-$2.99 above minimum





3. Less than minimum wage’
4. Minimum to minimum + $.99
5. Minimum + $1.00-$1.99 above minimum
6. Minimum + $2.00-$2.99 above minimum
7. Minimum + $3.00 or more above minimum
58.8 (1.6) 72,4 (1.4)
1.0 (0.3) 1,9 (0.4)
3.8 (0,6) 3,6 (0.6)
13.9 (1.1) 5.8 (0.8)
8,0 (0.9) 3.8 (0.6)
4.4 (0,7) 2.6 (0,5)
10.3 (1,0) 10.0 (1.0)
61,3 (1.6) 68.8 (1,5)
1.4 (0.4) 2.2 (0.5)
4.0 (0.6) 3,8 (0.6)
12.2 (1.1) 6.1 (0.8)
6.6 (0.8) 4,5 (0.7)
4.9 (0.7) 3.1 (0.6)

























NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses,
‘Percentage of all individuals (workers and non-workers) in tie specified wage internal,
“Percentage of net jobs atibutable to SSP in the specified wage interval, in decimal
terms (column 1 minus column 2)/(cohunn2 minus column 1of row 1),
cDMerence between the percentage of net jobs attributable to SSP in the specified wage
interval, and the percentage of conwol group workers’ jobs in the wage internal, in decimal terms
(column 3 minus (column 2/[column 1 minus column 2 of row 1]).
‘Information on wages was missing for some Individuals who may have been working
in casual or piece-rate jobs with compensation that cannot be easily converted to an hourly wage.
~uring the period under study. the minimum wage was $6.00 per hour in British Columbia
and $5.00 per hou in New Brunswick.Table 7
Response Rates for the SSP 18-NIonth Survey Sample
Total Program Control Control Group
Sample Group Group Minus Program
Sample (%) Only (%) Only (%) Group (%)
Total sample (first cohort of the 90.0 88.4 91.7 3.3 *
SSP research sample) (0.7) (1.0) (0.9) ([.3)
British Columbia 89.0 87.3 90,7 3.4 *
(0,9) (1,3) (1.1) (1.7)
New Brunswick 92.2 90.6 93,7 3,1
( I,0) (1,6) ([.3) (2.0)
On IA, month 18 91.1 88.5 93,3 4,8 *
(0.7) (1.2) (0,9) (1.5)
Off IA, month 18 87.1 88.2 85.5 -2.7
(i-4) (1.7) (2,4) (2,9)
Difference: on IA vs. off lAa 4,0 0.3 - 7.8 7.5 *
( 1.6) (2.1) (2,5) (3,3)
SOURCE: SRDC’S 18-month survey of the t’irstcohort of SSP sample members
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses.
An asterisk indicates [hat the control group-program group difference is statistically
significant Jt the 5 percent level.
‘The dit’ference in response rates between individuals who were receiving IA
payments in month 18 and [hose who were not. The entry in column 4 represents the relative













Comparison of Mean Labour Market Outcomes and Program Impacts:
Unweighed and Weighted SSP 18-Month Survey Sample Respondents
Unweighed Means Weighted Means
Outcome Measure Program Control Program Control Estimated Impact
and Time Period Group Group Group Group Unweighed Weighted
Average percentage
























































































































































































SOURCE: SRDC’S18-month survey of the first cohort of SSP sample memkrs.
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses.
An asterisk indicates that the impact estimate is statistically si~cant at the 5 percent level.